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Missouri Slams the Door On Employees of
Independent Contractors
Matteuzzi v. Columbus Partnership'
I. INTRODUCTION
Generally, a landowner is not liable for torts committed by an
independent contractor.2 However, a landowner may be held responsible by
an injured party if the work performed is "inherently dangerous."3 The issue
is further complicated if the injured party is an employee of the independent
contractor. While Missouri first allowed such a cause of action in 1928,' the
issue becomes more complex when considered in light of modem workers'
compensation insurance. This Note examines the evolution of the law in this
area and addresses the policies that aid in determining whether to allow
employees of independent contractors to recover in tort from landowners when
workers' compensation has already reimbursed them.
1. 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. 1993). Owens v. Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc.,
866 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. 1993) has similar facts to Matteuzzi and was decided the same
day. The court used the same principle for the holdings in both cases, and therefore
only the Matteuzzi case will be discussed in this Note. In Owens, the plaintiff was
injured as a result of an accident while he was painting a ceiling at the Shop 'N Save
store, whichwas undergoing construction. He worked for Paintsmith, Inc., whichwas
a subcontractor hired to do the paint work at the construction site. Mr. Owens filed
and collected a workers' compensation claim against Paintsmith. He then attempted
to sue Shop 'N Save using the inherently dangerous activity doctrine. The court held,
based onMatteuzzithat "Owens' apparentreliance on the inherently dangerous activity
doctrine is without merit." Owens, 866 S.W.2d at 133-34.
2. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 71,
at 509 (5th ed. 1984); The term "independent contractor" can generally be defined as
"a person who contracts with another to do something for him but who is not
controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect to his
physical conduct inthe performance of the undertaking." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 2(3) (1958).
3. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 512-15. Compare Salmon v. Kansas City,
145 S.W. 16 (Mo. 1912) andMallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice & Supply Co., 6 S.W.2d
617 (Mo. 1928).
4. Mallory, 6 S.W.2d at 626.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Columbus Partnership ("the Partnership") hired R.G. Ross
Construction Company ("R.G. Ross"), an independent contractor, to renovate
a deteriorating property owned by the Partnership.5 R.G. Ross employed the
plaintiff, James Matteuzzi, as an apprentice carpenter.6 His work entailed
replacing the roof rafters and sheathing on a building owned by the
Partnership.' This required him to be on the roof without any support, other
than a deteriorating, exterior, brick wall.' The wall collapsed while Matteuzzi
was working on the roof, and he fell to the ground.'
Matteuzzi filed a claim for workers' compensation with R.G Ross
Construction Company.'0 He then filed a separate claim for damages against
the Partnership, alleging it negligently failed to protect the independent
contractor's employees that were performing inherently dangerous
activities." The crux of the complaint was that the Partnership "breached a
nondelegable duty to assure that adequate precautions were taken to prevent
injury to employees of independent contractors engaged in inherently
dangerous activity."12  Additionally, Matteuzzi asserted that because
employees of an independent contractor are invitees, the landowner owed them
a duty to make the job site safe, regardless of whether inherently dangerous
activities were performed.13
The court held that since Matteuzzi was an employee of an independent
contractor, and since he was covered by worker's compensation insurance, the
inherently dangerous activity doctrine no longer applied to his situation. 4
Therefore, Matteuzzi could not recover from the Partnership under his
inherently dangerous activity claim.15 Furthermore, the court held Matteuzzi
could not recover as an invitee because the Partnership did not retain




9. Id. Matteuzzi fell approximately twenty-three feet. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 130.
13. Id. at 132.
14. Id. at 131. The court cited Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc.,
809 S.W.2d 384, 390 (Mo. 1993), as controlling precedent in this situation.
15. Matteuzzi, 866 S.W.2d at 131.
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"possession and control of the premises." '16 Thus, the duty of care shifted to
R.G. Ross, since it now controlled the property. 7
ifi. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Missouri's Approach
At common law, the general rule was that a person employing an
independent contractor 8 was not vicariously liable for torts committed by the
independent contractor. 9 Several exceptions to this rule evolved over
time."0 For example, if the work being performed by the independent
contractor was "inherently dangerous," the employer would not escape
vicarious liability for damages resulting from the performance of such
work.2
American courts widely accepted the inherently dangerous activity
doctrine, however, the courts have failed to set out a clear definition of what
constitutes an "inherently dangerous" activity. Missouri courts defined
inherently dangerous activities as work which is "intrinsically dangerous, and
the danger arises from the doing of the work and requires preventive care to
bring about safety."' Furthermore, whether an activity is inherently
dangerous is "a question of fact."24 Thus, the trier of fact must decide the
issue guided by this relatively obscure definition.25
In Missouri, the inherently dangerous doctrine was initially limited to
innocent third parties and did not apply to employees of an independent
16. Id. at 132.
17. Id. at 131.
18. See generally RESTATEMIENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §2 note b (1990). See
supra note 2 for a general definition of independent contractor.
19. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2.
20. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 509-16.
21. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 512.
22. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 512-13.
23. Smith v. Inter-County Tel. Co., 559 S.W.2d 518, 522 (Mo. 1977) (quoting
Carsonv. Blodgett Constr. Co., 174 S.W. 447, 448 (Mo. Ct. App. 1915)).
24. See Nance v. Leritz, 785 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). But cf.
Barbera v. Brod Dugan Co., 770 S.W.2d 318, 322 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989), where the
Eastern District Court of Appeals stated that whether the activity was inherently
dangerous was "a mixed question of law and fact which may be made by the trial
judge as a matter of law in certain cases."
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contractor.26  Then, in 1928, the Missouri Supreme Court extended the
doctrine to encompass the employees of independent contractors.27  In
Mallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice and Supply Co., the court held that as long as
the activity the employee was engaged at the time of injury related to the
reason why the work itself was inherently dangerous, then the employee could
hold the landowner liable under the inherently dangerous activity doctrine.28
The court reasoned an employee should not be put in a worse position than
a member of the general public. 29 Therefore, the doctrine protected both the
independent contractor's employees, and the general public.3" However, at
least since 1977 only employees of independent contractors have utilized the
doctrine.31
In 1977, in Smith v. Inter-County Telephone Co., the Missouri Supreme
Court decided that in order for an employee of an independent contractor to
recover under the inherently dangerous activity doctrine, the employee had to
demonstrate that the landowner was somehow negligent.32 More specifically,
the court held that in order for an employee to take advantage of the doctrine,
he or she must show that "the one contracting with the independent contractor
negligently failed to insure that adequate precautions were taken to avoid
damage by reason of the inherently dangerous activity."33
However, in 1990, the Missouri Supreme Court overruled Smith in
Ballinger v. Gascosage Electric Cooperative.4 The court stated that the
"Restatement correctly reflects Missouri law and.., there was no purpose in
26. Salmonv. Kansas City, 145 S.W. 16, 23 (Mo. 1912) ("[W]hatever duty the
[landowner] owes [he] owes it to the public and not to the servants of the contractor.").
27. Malloryv. Louisiana Pure Ice & Supply Co., 6 S.W.2d 617,626 (Mo. 1928).
28. Id. The court distinguished this case from Salmon by saying that the work
performed by the employee in Salmon was collateral to what made the work inherently
dangerous in the first place.
29. Id. at 626-27.
30. See id.
31. See generallyNancy L. Ripperger, Note, The Inherently Dangerous Doctrine
in Missouri: A Socially Just Doctrine?, 56 Mo. L. REv. 479, 484 n.32 (1991).
Similarly, this author could find no cases in Missouri after 1977 in which the party
using the inherently dangerous activity exception was simply an unconnected third
party.
32. Smith, 559 S.W.2d at 523.
33. Id. The plaintiff also had to show that (1) the performance involved some
"inherently dangerous activity;" (2) "the activity which caused the damage was
reasonablynecessaryto the performance of the contract andwas inherently dangerous;"
(3) the landowner was negligent; and (4) the damage was a "direct result of such
negligence." Id.
34. 788 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. 1990).
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Smith to change the governing law." 35 Therefore, the court held a plaintiff
need not show negligence under this doctrine.36 The liability that attaches
is "purely vicarious.
37
In 1991, the court reexamined the inherently dangerous activity doctrine
with respect to employees of independent contractors covered by workers'
compensation insurance. 8  In the landmark decision of Zueck v.
Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., the court held that employees of
independent contractors covered under worker's compensation could no longer
use the inherently dangerous activity doctrine to recover from the
landowner.39 The "obvious purpose of the doctrine is to prevent the
landowner . . . from avoiding liability and defeating the recovery of an
injured, innocent third party, by hiring a contractor who is not fiscally
responsible to do the dangerous work."4 Since Missouri law (at this point)
required no showing of negligence, the landowner's liability was purely
vicarious.4" If the independent contractor's employees were allowed to sue
the landowner under the inherently dangerous activity doctrine, then the
landowner essentially becomes an "insurer of the employee's injury.142 With
the evolution of the modem compulsory workers' compensation insurance
system, the employee was now adequately insured and the need for the
inherently dangerous activity doctrine as applied to employees of independent
contractors had ceased to exist.
43
The inherently dangerous activity doctrine appeared to have come full
circle. Its use was once again exclusively restricted to unconnected third
parties. However, in a concurring opinion Chief Justice Blackmar hinted
at the possibility that the Smith case may still be viable in a situation where
the "evidence supports a finding of a duty from the owner to others and a
breach of that duty through the owner's own negligence."45
In 1992, Chief Justice Blackmar's theory was tested before the Eastern
District Court of Appeals in Halmick v. SBC Corporate Services, Inc. 6 The
35. Id. at 511.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Zueckv. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d384 (Mo. 1991).
39. Id. at 384.
40. Id. at 386.
41. See Ballinger, 788 S.W.2d at 510; see also RESTATEMNT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 416, 427 (1990).
42. Zueck, 809 S.W.2d at 387.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 391 (Blackmar, C.J., concurring).
46. 832 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
1041
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plaintiff attempted to combine two doctrines into a hybrid theory.47 The
petition alleged the landowner "was negligent in failing 'to insure that
adequate precautions were taken to avoid injury .. .by reason of the
inherently dangerous activity,"' and, additionally the landowner was
overseeing the performance by the independent contractors. 8 The plaintiff
argued that because the activity was inherently dangerous and the landowner
had agents present while the work was being performed, the landowner had
a duty to insure that proper safety precautions were taken.49 The court held
this argument invalid." The court stated that Zueck had eliminated "the
inherently dangerous/non-inherently dangerous activity dichotomy" in
Missouri." The court did not completely foreclose the possibility that Smith
may provide a viable theory for the use of the inherently dangerous activity
doctrine, but stated that, on these facts, the plaintiff did not demonstrate that
the landowner had sufficient control of the activities.52
The Missouri Supreme Court finally slammed the door on the use of the
inherently dangerous activity doctrine by employees of independent contractors
in Matteuzzi 3  The court clearly stated that as an employee of an
independent contractor, Matteuzzi had no cause of action under the inherently
dangerous activity doctrine. 4 In addition, the court held that before a duty
would arise mandating that a landowner protect the employee as an invitee,
the landowner's control of the premises must be found to be "substantial,"
55
47. Id. at 926-27.
48. Id. at 927.
49. See Halmick, 832 S.W.2d at 927. The plaintiff amended the complaint three
times, therefore it is not entirely clear what the exact theory of liability was. The
court appears to oversimplify the theory by stating that the contention was that "a duty
arose on the part of SBC to insure the work was performed safely." Id. However,
from the complaint it appears to the author that the inherently dangerous activity
doctrine was meant to play a more significant role than what the court allowed.
50. Id. at 928.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 929 (the landowner's "involvement in overseeing [the activity] must be
substantial" for a duty to arise.).
53. Matteuzzi, 866 S.W.2d at 132. See infra notes 65-90 and accompanying text.
54. Matteuzzi, 866 S.W.2d at 132. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
The court also noted that Smith is overruled to the extent that it "authorize[s] a cause
of action in favor of employees of independent contractors covered by workers'
compensation." Matteuzzi, 866 S.W.2d at 132.
55. Matteuzzi, 866 S.W.2d at 132 (quoting Halmick, 832 S.W.2d at 929).
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B. The Approach of Other Jurisdictions
The trend among jurisdictions outside of Missouri addressing the use of
the inherently dangerous activity doctrine by employees of an independent
contractor, in light of modem workers' compensation statutes, has been to
limit the use of the doctrine to unconnected third parties.56 One frequently
cited rationale behind the restriction is that because the cost of workers'
compensation insurance will inevitably be passed on to the landowner in the
contract price, in reality, the landowner bears the burden of paying for
workers' compensation insurance.57 In return, the landowner should receive
the benefit of not being subject to a lawsuit.5 Another rationale offered is
if the landowner were subject to this double liability, he would be encouraged
to use his own (possibly unqualified) employees rather than a more qualified
independent contractor. 9 Furthermore, some courts have reasoned that to
allow an employee to maintain a cause of action against the landowner, in
addition to his or her recovery under a workers' compensation statute, would
result in an unjust "windfall" for the employee.6" Therefore, the employee
should be limited to workers' compensation as the sole method of recovery.61
A very limited number of jurisdictions have allowed the employee to
maintain a cause of action under the inherently dangerous doctrine even after
56. Edward J. Henderson, Note, Liability to Employees of Independent
Contractors Engaged in Inherently Dangerous Work: A Workable Workers'
Compensation Proposal, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1165, 1178-81 (1980).
57. See Sloan v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 552 P.2d 157, 159-60 (Alaska 1976);
Welker v. Kennecott Copper Co., 403 P.2d 330, 338 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965); Privette
v. Superior Court (Contreias), 854 P.2d 721, 728 (Cal. 1993); Ray v. Schneider, 548
A.2d 461, 466 (Conn. Ct. App. 1988); Johns v. New York Blower Co., 442 N.E.2d
382, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Dillard v. Strecker, 861 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1993); King v. Shelby Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 502 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1973), cert. denied 417 U.S. 932 (1974); Rowley v. Mayor of Baltimore, 505
A.2d 494, 501 (Md. 1986); Conover v. Northern States Power Co., 313 N.W.2d 397,
405 (Minn. 1981); Matteuzzi v. Columbus Partnership, 866 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Mo.
1993); Woodsonv. Rowland, 373 S.E.2d 674, 677 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Curless v.
Lathrop Co., 583 N.E.2d 1367, 1378 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); Tauscher v. Puget Sound
Power & Light Co., 635 P.2d 426, 430 (Wash. 1981); Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
718 P.2d 890, 899 (Wyo. 1986).
58. See cases cited supra note 57.
59. See, e.g., King, 502 S.W.2d at 663; Jones, 718 P.2d. at 899; see also
Henderson, supra note 56, at 1181 n.77.
60. See, e.g., Vagle v. Picklands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir.
1979) (applying Minnesota law), cert. denied444 U.S. 1033 (1980); King, 502 S.W.2d
at 663.
61. Vagle, 611 F.2d at 1218; King, 502 S.W.2d at 663.
1043
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recovering workers' compensation from their immediate employer.62 The
Hawaii Supreme Court allowed such a recovery on the theory that landowners
did not fall within the definition of "employer," and therefore the exclusivity
of workers' compensation did not apply to landowners.63 Thus, how a
jurisdiction resolves the issue may depend heavily on the particular workers'
compensation statute in that jurisdiction.64 Most of the jurisdictions
considering the issue have chosen not to construe the term "employer" so
narrowly as to allow an employee to circumvent the purpose of the workers'
compensation laws.65
IV. INSTANT DECISION
After reciting the relevant facts,66 a unanimous Missouri Supreme Court
emphasized the difference between section 413 and section 416 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).67 The court noted that section 413
imposes liability only if the landowner (a) "fails to provide in the contract that
the contractor shall take such precautions, or (b) fails to exercise reasonable
care to provide in some other manner for the taking of such precautions."68
On the other hand, section 416 imposes liability on the landowner if
precautions were not taken, even if special precautions were provided for in
the contract.69 The court stated that the only difference between the two
sections was "the direct imposition of liability on a landowner who fails to
provide in the contract or otherwise for the taking of any necessary
precautions.""
62. See, e.g., Makaneole v. Gampon, 777 P.2d 1183 (Haw. 1989); Elliott v.
Public Serv. Co., 517 A.2d 1185 (N.H. 1986). The decision may be affected by the
individual statesworkers' compensation statute and the definition of "employer" within
that statute. Also, not all jurisdictions have decided the issue with regard to workers'
compensation.
63. Makeneole, 777 P.2d at 1187.
64. Specifically, the issue turns on the drafting of the workers' compensation
statute of the jurisdiction, and whether the legislature has chosento define "employer"
in the statute.
65. See cases cited supra note 57.
66. Matteuzzi, 866 S.W.2d at 129-30. See supra notes 6-18 and accompanying
text.
67. Matteuzzi, 866 S.W.2d at 130-31.
68. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 413 (1965)).
69. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1965)).
70. Id. at 131.
1044 [Vol. 59
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The court then analyzed Missouri cases relevant to the issue." The
distinguished Ballinger from Smith,72 stating that while Ballinger stated a
cause of action based purely on vicarious liability, it did not preclude a cause
of action involving landowner negligence like that in Smith. 3 The court then
stated that Zueck held "[w]here workers' compensation law provides for
liability of negligent third parties, as Missouri's does, there exists no valid
reason to hold landowners vicariously liable to employees of independent
contractors engaged in inherently dangerous activities."' 4 After Zueck, the
doctrine was still available to "any third party not covered by workers'
compensation."75
Matteuzzi's pleadings, however, did not allege a cause of action based on
purely vicarious liability, as the Zueck case required. 6 Matteuzzi claimed
that the landowner was liable based on section 413 of the Restatement.7
Matteuzzi claimed the Partnership was liable because they were "negligent in
failing to take reasonable precautions to insure that the premises were safe for
third parties, including the contractor's employees. ' M The court stated the
"Court of Appeals tacitly recognized" that Zueck had effectively abolished
actions brought under both section 413 and section 416." The Missouri
Supreme Court noted that, because the same policy considerations'apply to
both sections, the court of appeals was correct in barring an action based on
landowner negligence like that in Smith."0
The court relied on two principal reasons for barring employee recovery
under the inherently dangerous activity doctrine.81 First, the cost of workers'
compensation coverage is generally passed on to the landowner, as it is
reflected in the contract price the independent contract chargesY Therefore,
it would be unfair to the landowner to allow employees to recover from the
71. Id. at 131-32.
72. See Ballinger v. Gasconade Elec. Coop., 788 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. 1990); Smith
v. Inter-County Tel. Co., 559 S.W.2d 518, 523 (Mo. 1977). See supranotes 33, 35
and accompanying text.
73. Matteuzzi, 866 S.W.2d at 131.
74. Id. (quoting Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d





79. Id. (citing Halmick v. SBC Corporate Serv., Inc., 832 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1992).
80. Id. at 131-32.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 131.
1994] 1045
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landowner under the doctrine, because such a recovery effectively subjects the
landowner to "double liability."'  Second, the court reasoned if the
landowner were subject to liability despite having paid for workers'
compensation coverage, landowners would be encouraged to use their own
employees to perform the inherently dangerous work, rather then hiring an
expert in that particular field.' In doing so, a landowner would limit his
liability, but would increase the risk of injury to others.85 Therefore, the
court held that "Matteuzzi, as the employee of the landowner's independent
contractor, has no cause of action under either variation of the inherently
dangerous activity doctrine."86
Furthermore, the court noted that the landowner may owe a duty to make
the premises safe to the employee as an "invitee."' Whether that duty arises,
however, depends on the amount of control the landowner has over the
work's According to the court, the control must be "substantial" before any
such duty will arise. 9 If a landowner "relinquishes possession and control
... to the independent contractor," i.e., does not retain "substantial" control,
the duty to make the premises safe for invitees passes to the independent
contractor.9" In the present case, Matteuzzi's petition did not allege
sufficient activities on the part of the landowner rising to the level of
"substantial" control.9" Therefore, the court affirmed dismissal of the
petition.'
V. COMMENT
One of the overarching goals of tort law is to make the injured party
whole again-to restore the status quo.93 This reasoning justifies holding a
83. Id. at 131-32. The "double liability" the court spoke of was "workers'
compensation coverage and liability under the inherently dangerous activity doctrine."
Id.
84. Id. at 132.
85. Id. The court stated that this was "counter-productive[]."
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also Halmick, 832 S.W.2d at 929.
89. Matterzzi, 866 S.W.2d at 132 (quoting Halmick, 832 S.W.2d at 929).
90. Id. (citing Halmick, 832 S.W.2d at 927; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 422 and cmt. c, at 405 (1965)).
91. Id. "Matteuzzi's sole allegation of 'control' [was] that '[t]he subject property
was owned and/or controlled by [the Partnership]." The court stated that this was not
enough to show "'substantial' control." Id.
92. Id.
93. See Ripperger, supra note 31, at 486.
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landowner who commissions an inherently dangerous activity vicariously
liable for injuries to innocent third parties not associated with the contracting
relationship.94 However, when an employee of an independent contractor is
guaranteed recovery under workers' compensation, one must question whether
allowing that worker a cause of action against the landowner is consistent with
the overarching goal of tort law.
One of the main reasons for holding a landowner liable to a third party
under this doctrine is to assure that an injured party has an avenue for
recovery, even if the independent contractor who actually committed the tort
is insolvent.95  However, with the advent of compulsory workers'
compensation laws, when an employee of an independent contractor is injured,
the employee is assured compensation from the common fund into which the
employer pays. Since the purpose of making the injured employee whole
again is accomplished through workers' compensation, the court in Matteuzzi
is justified in limiting the doctrine to unconnected third parties.
Additionally, the landowner "pays either indirectly or directly 'for the
compensation coverage when he contracts with the independent
contractor."' 96 Since the landowner indirectly bears the burden of paying
into the workers' compensation fund, he or she should also receive the benefit
the fund offers other employers. The benefit of workers' compensation to the
employer is that by paying premiums, the employer is relieved of all other
liability.97 To hold an employer (the landowner) who pays for the coverage
liable for an employee's injury that arises out of the course of employment
would be contrary to the purpose of workers' compensation. Such an
approach would essentially "punish] landowners who seek expert assistance"
in performing inherently dangerous activities."
Furthermore, to hold a landowner liable discourages the landowner from
hiring experts to do the inherently dangerous work simply because they were
independent contractors.99 Discouraging landowners from hiring experts to
perform dangerous work would not be economically efficient to society, as
94. Ripperger, supra note 31, at 486-87.
95. See, e.g., Ripperger, supra note 31, at 486-87.
96. Matteuzzi, 866 S.W.2d at 131 (quoting Zueck, 809 S.W.2d at 389).
97. Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.120(1) (Supp. 1994) states in part:
Every employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be
liable, irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation under the
provisions of this chapter for personal injury or death of the employee by
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and shall be
released from all other liability thereof whatsoever.
98. Zueck, 809 S.W.2d at 388.
99. Matteuzzi, 866 S.W.2d at 132.
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more injuries would likely result from laymen preforming such dangerous
work.
In addition, if employees of independent contractors were allowed to sue
in tort, the landowner would be subject to "double liability."100 Courts must
take into account the possibility that an employee, if given the opportunity to
sue the landowner, may be given an "unwarranted windfall." '' Workers'
compensation laws are a "product of a tradeoff;" the employer "assumes
automatic liability," and "the employee forfeits his right to a potentially
lucrative common law judgment in return for assured compensation."'" If
the employee is allowed to sue the landowner, who is at least his constructive
employer, if not his direct employer, then the employee is not upholding his
or her end of the workers' compensation bargain.
It may be argued that policy considerations in favor of the landowner are
not as strong in a case like Matteuzzi, where the plaintiff alleges that the
landowner was negligent in not providing that precautions be taken to protect
the worker from the inherently dangerous work. 3 In order to avoid
liability in such a case, a landowner need only provide in the employment
contract that the independent contractor must take reasonable precautions to
protect from injury."' Arguably, this requirement decreases on-the-job
injuries, and therefore ultimately reduces the burden placed on the workers'
compensation fund. However, under typical workers' compensation laws,
whether the employer was negligent or not is irrelevant. 5 The employee
recovers from the fund regardless of the employer's actions.10 6 Therefore,
it should not matter if the landowner was negligent in not providing for
precautions. Since the landowner is essentially paying for the coverage, the
landowner should be treated the same as any regular employer.
A final consideration is whether landowners were the intended
beneficiaries of the workers' compensation laws. 07 The Hawaii Supreme
Court concluded that the definition of "employer," which originally included
a landowner who hired an independent contractor but was later amended to
exclude the landowner, excluded landowners from the scope of the Hawaii
workers' compensation laws. 0 s Therefore, the "exclusivity clause" only
100. See id. at 131-32.
101. See, e.g., Vagle v. Picklands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1033 (1980).
102. Zueck, 809 S.W.2d at 388.
103. Matteuzzi, 866 S.W.2d at 130.
104. See id.
105. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.120(1) (Supp. 1992), supra note 97.
106. Id.
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applied to the "direct employer," and the employee was free to maintain a
cause of action against the landowner who commissioned the inherently
dangerous activity."0 9
The majority of the states considering this issue have decided not to give
the term "employer" such a narrow definition, deciding instead that competing
policy considerations warrant giving the term a broad definition."' Missouri
cases indicate the term "employer" should be given a liberal definition to
effectively carry out the purposes of the workers' compensation laws.
11
'
Matteuzzi did not address the issue of whether a landowner is an "employer"
for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act,"' but it follows that a
party who paid into the fund should be an intended beneficiary of the law."'
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the policies and purposes behind workers' compensation laws,
the Matteuzzi decision offers the correct approach. It recognizes that workers'
compensation laws adequately allocate the risk of injury. Courts should not
be permitted to circumvent workers' compensation statutes by allowing an
employee of an independent contractor to sue a landowner who is effectively
his or her employer.
MATTHEW A. CLEMENT
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., supra note 60.
111. Specie v. Howerton Elec. Co., 344 S.W.2d 314, 315 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
112. See Matteuzzi v. Columbus Partnership, 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. 1993).
113. The intended beneficiaries of the workers' compensation act may be set out
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